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Effectiveness of gaming for communicating and teaching 
climate change 
Jasper N. Meyaa,b and Klaus Eisenackb 
a Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, Germany 
b Resource Economics Group, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
Abstract 
Games are increasingly proposed as an innovative way to convey scientific insights on the climate-
economic system to students, non-experts and the wider public. Yet, it is not clear if games can meet such 
expectations. We present quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of a simulation game for 
communicating and teaching international climate politics. We use a sample of over two hundred students 
from Germany playing the simulation game KEEP COOL. We combine pre- and postgame surveys on climate 
politics with data on individual in-game decisions. Our key findings are that gaming increases the sense of 
personal responsibility, the confidence in politics for climate change mitigation, and makes more optimistic 
about international cooperation in climate politics. Furthermore, players that chose to defect in the game 
become more optimistic about international cooperation but less confident about politics. We conclude 
that simulation games can facilitate experiential learning about the difficulties of international climate 
politics and thereby complement both conventional communication and teaching methods. 
Keywords: climate change, international climate agreements, simulation games, climate change 
communication, education for sustainable development 
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1. Introduction 
Effective climate politics rely on public understanding and support for climate change mitigation. 
Empirically, climate change awareness is an important determinant of public support for climate policies 
(Rhodes et al. 2017). However, while scientific knowledge on anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system is increasingly consolidating (IPCC 2014), this does not automatically carry over into public 
awareness. To the contrary, studies show decreasing public concern about the environment in general 
(Franzen and Vogl 2013) and about climate change in particular in the US and Western Europe since the 
mid 2000s (Capstick et al. 2015; Stoutenborough et al. 2014). This calls for innovative ways of science based 
climate change communication and teaching. For instance, in the US secondary school students show 
serious misconceptions about climate change (e.g. Shepardson et al. 2011) and graduate students do not 
feel sufficiently educated in climate change issues (Kuster and Fox 2017). Scholars have highlighted the 
need to further investigate interactive modes of communication to create a meaningful understanding of 
the climate system (Ballantyne et al. 2016). For these purposes, our paper contributes to evaluating the 
potential of revolving around climate change climate games. 
There are now dozens of games on climate change (‘climate games’) available (see Reckien and Eisenack 
2013, Wu and Lee 2015 for reviews). Several authors have highlighted the high comparative potential of 
simulation games for climate change communication and teaching for several reasons (e.g. Gugerell and 
Zuidema 2017; Mendler de Suarez et al. 2012; Sterman 2011). Simulation games might allow to experience 
the complex, non-linear dynamics of the climate system, and to test out different strategies without real 
world consequences. At the same time, they are easily understandable for non-experts and an appealing 
and entertaining approach to the serious issue of climate change. However, hitherto there is little empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of games for climate change communication and teaching (cf. Haug et al. 
2011; Klöckner 2015: 205). There is also limited knowledge on how the particular rule-design of climate 
change games affects the way in which beliefs about climate politics are changed. 
The present study extends the few existing ones in at least three ways in order to contribute to a more 
comprehensive assessment of whether and how games can effectively communicate and teach climate 
change. First, the effectiveness of a simulation game on climate change is tested quantitatively. Second, we 
investigate how students’ beliefs about international climate politics change through gaming. Finally and 
third, we study how the kind of decisions made within the game (and thus the game design) changes beliefs 
about international climate politics. 
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So far quantitative evaluations of simulation games on climate change have been inconclusive and mainly 
conducted with small samples of decision makers. Van Pelt et al. (2015) study the effectiveness of 
communicating climate change risk to water managers, yielding insignificant differences between 
experimental and control groups. Haug et al. (2011) evaluate the learning effect of a simulation game on 
European climate policy for policy-makers and experts. The results indicate that central issues in the 
simulation game, burden sharing and emission trading, become more pronounced in participant’s concept 
maps after the game session. Recently, there have been more systematic studies on effectiveness of games 
in the context of climate change. Rumore et al. (2016) have conducted a comprehensive study on a role-
play on climate change adaptation in different communities. They find a significant increase in awareness 
about climate change risk and confidence in town’s ability to adapt. While they conclude that role-plays are 
a valuable tool for stakeholder engagement, it remains open how far theses finding can be generalize to 
other types of climate games. Our study, in contrast, assesses a game that is focused on global climate 
politics instead of local adaptation strategies. 
The study by Sterman et al. (2015) is similar to ours in this respect. They evaluate the computer-backed 
role-play game WORLD CLIMATE to test acquisition of cognitive knowledge and personal attitude changes 
on climate change of the 173 participants. They find evidence for an increased understanding of climate 
dynamics (in particular the distinction of stock and flows). Their results indicate that the game might be an 
effective tool to teach climate change, but also consider that it conveys insights on the difficulties to 
enforce a global climate agreement, so that participants might become skeptical about its successfulness. 
The study employs a pre- and a postgame-questionnaire in different surveys without a common sampling 
strategy and does not measure in-game behavior like we do. Our study thus aims at not treating the game 
as a black box. Understanding the latter is crucial, we argue, if climate games shall be well-designed. 
In order to shed light on the effectiveness of a simulations game for communicating and teaching 
international climate politics, we combine a standardized pre- and postgame survey on climate politics with 
observed data on individual in-game decisions in a carefully selected sample of two hundred German 
secondary school students playing the simulation game KEEP COOL (Eisenack and Petschel-Held 2004, 
Eisenack 2013). We test hypotheses using ordered-probit and ordinary least squares estimators. KEEP COOL 
is characterized by a sophisticated science based climate-economic model conveying the key features of 
state-of-the-art science on climate change modelling in a board game interface. In order to win, players 
need to balance their regional economic interests against contributions to global public goods, i.e. the 
avoidance of dangerous interference with the climate. Players have to choose every round between 
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cooperative and defective moves, so that an in-game climate change regime can evolve (Meya and Meya 
2016). 
We find that players significantly change their beliefs about international climate politics in the following 
ways: they become more confident in the potential for politics to mitigate climate change, become more 
optimistic about effective international cooperation on climate change mitigation, and perceive themselves 
as more responsible for climate change mitigation. Interestingly, players do not transfer their in-game 
decisions directly to their beliefs about international climate politics. Instead, players testing defective 
strategies within the game become more optimistic about international cooperation in climate politics – 
highlighting experiential learning as a central asset of simulation games on climate change. These findings 
provide further support that simulation games in general and KEEP COOL in particular can be promising as 
innovative tools to teach and communicate international climate politics. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We present hypotheses on learning from a simulation 
game on international climate politics in Section 2. The methods are described in Section 3, and results are 
reported in Section 4. Section 5 discusses and concludes. 
2. Communicating and teaching international climate politics with simulation 
games 
In this section we discuss key design elements for simulation games on international climate politics and 
associated learning potentials. Subsequently we lay out our hypotheses on how playing a game might 
change beliefs about climate politics. 
2.1  Games on international climate politics 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) heads of governments have 
been meeting annually for more than two decades to negotiate the climate change governance regime. 
However, agreements like the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement have not been effective in limiting 
global warming so far. Economic analysis, following early contributions of Hoel (1992), Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994), have highlighted free-riding incentives as a main explanation. More 
recent research suggests that international cooperation on climate change is further complicated through 
voting behavior and interest group influence (e.g. Wangler et al. 2013), uncertainty about cost and benefits 
of mitigation (e.g. Finus and Pintassilgo 2013, Meya et al. 2017), non-linearities and tipping points (e.g. 
Barrett 2013, Dellink et al. 2013, Eisenack and Kähler 2016), and many more. If we consider public opinion 
to be one determinant of governmental decision making (Lee et al. 2015, Tjernström and Tietenberg 2008, 
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Ziegler 2017), e.g. through voting in democratic systems, and if we aspire for well-informed and educated 
decision makers on all institutional levels, it is of utmost importance to convey scientific insights on the 
reasons for and the challenges to climate politics. 
Games are considered promising to communicate and teach complex system dynamics, as they work as 
playable “interactive system dynamic models” (Mendler de Suarez et al. 2012: 6). This seems to be 
particularly important in the context of sustainable development. In simulation games, a subgroup of 
serious games1, players can engage and influence complex dynamic systems, but are not able to control the 
outcomes entirely (Dieleman and Huisingh 2006). Based on relatively simple formal rules, simulation games 
create complexity and provide unique individual experience (Mendler de Suarez et al. 2012). 
Like crafting an analytical or numerical model in scientific research, game design requires breaking down 
the subjective matter to its key components. Therefore, a natural starting point for a simulation game on 
international climate politics is to convey the mechanics of state of the art scientific models2 to a playable 
game interface (e.g. Sterman et al. 2015). A simulation game on international climate politics can be 
designed as a more sophisticated version of a common pool game (see also Fennewald and Kievit-Kylar 
2012), like the FishBanks (Meadows et al. 1989). Stepping in the role of politicians, players have to decide 
about trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and climate change damages in face of a dynamic coupled 
climate-economic model. On this base, rules can be elaborated further to resemble features of the political, 
economic and climate system that are central to cooperation. 
The literature discusses several ways in which well-designed simulation games can complement traditional 
communication and teaching methods, in particular: 
(1) Simulation games allow active engagement and thereby promote experiential learning. Players 
make individual, first hand experience (Mendler de Suarez et al. 2012) of otherwise abstract 
phenomena like strategic interaction, path dependency or feed-back effects. This experience may 
create an enormous learning potential due to the emotions they trigger (Wu and Lee 2015). 
(2) Simulation games offer a safe learning environment to test different decisions and experience 
resulting geophysical, economic and political system dynamics. In climate change many 
consequences are irreversible and removed in space and/or time. Like in a flight simulator (Sterman 
et al. 2015), players can take risk and learn by doing without negative consequences for the real 
                                                          
1 Serious games are defined by design purpose (Wu and Lee 2015) or usage (Crookall 2010), encompassing, beyond 
entertainment, also communicative and educative objectives. 
2 Regionalized integrated assessment models are one common tool to study the formation of international climate 
agreements taking into account the climate-economic system dynamics (early contribution by Nordhaus and Yang 
(1996); for an overview of existing models see Lessmann et al. (2015)). 
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world (Mendler de Suarez et al 2012). Learning from failure might provoke the consideration of 
alternative approaches (Dieleman and Huisingh 2006). 
(3) Simulation games can make players aware of mismatches of their mental models with complex 
system dynamics. Policy makers and the public often systematically fail to account for the dynamics 
of complex systems (Sterman 2011, Sterman et al. 2013 ), offering a high learning potential of 
simulation games through changing players’ mental models (Mendler de Suarez et al 2012). 
Scientific illiteracy and difficulties of non-experts have been identified as one barrier to public 
engagement in climate change (Wibeck 2014). 
(4) Simulation games make science more easily accessible and offer a common language for 
heterogeneous audiences. They can serve as a boundary object between science and policy makers 
by making scientific analysis of international climate politics assessable and tangible (cf. van Pelt 
2015). Moreover, a shared game experience provides common and scientifically sound grounds for 
starting discussion among different stakeholders like researchers, students, policy makers, the 
wider public and further actors that are dealing with issues of sustainable development (Dieleman 
and Huisingh 2006, Eisenack 2013). 
2.2 Testing the effectiveness of games on international climate politics 
Our approach falls into the category of intervention-oriented research on the effectiveness of serious 
games (cf. Mayer et al. 2014). In the following we elaborate two sets of hypotheses. 
First, we expect that a well-designed simulation game on international climate politics will influence 
players’ beliefs about international climate politics. Engaging in-game with the climate system and 
experiencing consequences of human interference is likely to increase personal responsibility for climate 
change mitigation (cf. Mendler de Suarez et al. 2012). However, experiencing the system dynamics could 
also promote a feeling of pessimism on both personal and political levels, as players learn about systematic 
obstacles to effective global climate change mitigation (in particular free-riding behavior) and learn that 
good will alone is not sufficient (cf. Sterman et al. 2015). Moreover, the in-game experience might result in 
a re-assessment of individuals’ expectations on international climate politics and the ability of politicians in 
limiting climate change. We therefore establish a first set of hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 1: Climate games have the ability to change players’ beliefs about international climate politics. 
In particular, gaming 
• increases personal responsibility to contribute to climate change mitigation (H1.1), 
• increases confidence in politicians to take actions against climate change (H1.2), 
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• increases expectations about effective international cooperation on climate change (H1.3), 
• decreases pessimism in climate politics, i.e. the belief that climate politics will be ineffective in any 
case (H1.4). 
Second, we are interested in how, if at all, changes in beliefs are related to in-game behaviour. If a game on 
international climate politics is indeed fostering experiential learning, attitudes towards climate politics 
should be correlated with individual decisions made in game (cf. Mayer et al. 2014). Understanding how 
different components for decision-making offered by a game lead to a conductive game experience is 
essential for developing well-designed climate games. We classify in-game decisions into two categories: (i) 
cooperative decisions, where players chose climate change mitigating game moves, thereby contributing to 
the public good; and (ii) defective decisions, where player chose greenhouse gas emitting game moves, 
thereby behaving as free-riders on others’ mitigation efforts. 
Negative as well as positive correlations between in-game decisions (independent variable) and changing 
beliefs about international climate politics (dependent variable) seem plausible. When players cooperate in 
the game, the obstacles to international cooperation might be perceived as manageable and players might 
expect cooperation in international climate politics also to be more successful. On the other hand, players 
that tried out defective strategies within the game might be particularly convinced about the necessity of 
international cooperation, due to the resulting reactions of the climate system experienced. This gives rise 
to two contradicting hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 2: Decisions within a simulation game on international climate politics relate to changes in 
beliefs about international climate politics. In particular: 
• The more cooperative in-game decisions players make, the more optimistic about the success of 
international climate politics they are subsequently (H2.1). 
• The more defective in-game decisions players make, the more optimistic about the success of 
international climate politics they are subsequently (H2.2). 
3. Methods 
The effectiveness of the simulation game KEEP COOL is assessed by combing quantitative data on individual 
in-game decisions with pre- and postgame surveys on international climate politics. In this section we 
describe the research design, the simulation game KEEP COOL, the instruments for data collection and the 
statistical methods employed. 
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3.1 Research design 
The study employs the established simulation game KEEP COOL. Participants are students in selected 
school classes. Participant’s beliefs are assessed with a questionnaire before and after they play the game. 
During the game, their decisions are recorded. Selection biases are minimized as participation was 
mandatory for the students. The representativeness of the sample is assessed by including items in the 
pregame questionnaire that can be compared with representative studies for Germany. 
The sample heterogeneity is minimized by focusing on students aged between 13 and 16 years from three 
cities in North-West Germany (Bremen, Delmenhorst, Oldenburg). Game events took place in class rooms, 
so that external interference is minimal and the setting is relatively close to a laboratory situation. Beliefs 
about international climate politics are measured directly before and after playing KEEP COOL in order to 
assess intrapersonal changes. 
All game events follow an identical timeline. They start with an introduction of the facilitator and by 
splitting the students into parallel groups for the game sessions. Subsequently, the pregame questionnaires 
are filled out individually, then the game is played (about 60 minutes), directly followed by the postgame 
survey. In order to isolate the effect of KEEP COOL, neither a content related introduction nor a debriefing 
takes place. 
Game events were conducted over three months from 26.11.2014 to 26.02.2015 at six different schools. 
KEEP COOL was played 43 times, 235 students participated in the survey and for a subset of 200 students 
data on in-game decisions was recorded. 
3.2 The simulation game KEEP COOL 
We use KEEP COOL (Eisenack and Petschel-Held 2004) as a prime example for a climate game. It is the first 
commercially available board game on climate change. It is distinct from most other climate games, in 
particular, (i) through its detailed simulation of the climate-economic system (Wu and Lee 2015: 414) based 
on which political issues such as free-riding and agenda setting power can be experienced and political 
institutions can be tested, and (ii) that it puts the global and political aspects of the topic to the center, and 
not everyday decisions of young people as many environmental games do (Wu and Lee 2015). 
In KEEP COOL each player takes the role of one of six country groups which frequently develop joint 
positions in climate negotiations: developing countries, Europe, countries in transition (from the former 
Soviet Union), the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), rapidly industrializing 
countries (in particular China, India, Brazil), and the Umbrella group (in particular the US, Japan, Canada, 
Australia). Players can chose between carbon emitting and more costly carbon neutral technologies (‘black’ 
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and ‘green’ factories), adapt to climate change or undertake research and development to decrease costs 
of carbon emitting or carbon neutral technologies. During a game session carbon emissions accumulate in 
the atmosphere, causing a rising global temperature. The probability and intensity of damages from 
extreme events increase with global temperature. When a critical threshold of accumulated emissions is 
crossed, all players lose. Alternatively, the game ends when a player wins by achieving its country groups’ 
economic growth targets and fulfilling randomly assigned lobby interests.3 
The mechanic of this basic climate-economic model gives rise to a global collective action problem, where 
each country group has incentives to free-ride on the others mitigation efforts. Remarkably, international 
climate politics, the core subject of the game, is not explicitly modelled. Instead, politics and possible 
international institutions emerge from the player’s interaction within the game. In fact, as a core rule of 
KEEP COOL, players are allowed to negotiate on everything. Thus, players find themselves in a situation 
where they can invent and test different institutions for climate change mitigation and experience both the 
necessity of and obstacles for global cooperation (Meya and Meya 2016). 
3.3 Instruments for data collection 
An overview on the studied concepts, the variables to measures them, and the instruments for data 
collection is given in Table 1. The pregame questionnaire includes basic demographic information and prior 
experience with games. Furthermore, it contains eleven established items from three different 
representative studies on environmental attitudes in Germany (BMUB/BfN 2014; GESIS 2010, Infratest 
2010). Six items were newly designed to capture beliefs about international climate politics. In the 
postgame survey, respondents are additionally asked for their motivation and engagement during the 
game, how well they comprehend the game rules, and whether they cooperated with other players in the 
game. All items in the questionnaires were rated on a five point Likert scale from completely disagree to 
completely agree (see supplementary material). 
A standardized observatioten sheet is used to track in-game decisions. Cooperative and defective decisions 
are only recorded if they are underpinned by a flow of game currency. Thus, we abstract from ‘soft’ 
cooperation and defection like verbal agreements or emotional support. We measure cooperation and 
defection by players’ decisions for carbon neutral or carbon emitting technologies. A description of all 
variables used for the statistical analysis is given in Table 2. Two pretests were conducted prior to the 
survey, the first with university students and the second with 41 participants under field conditions. 
                                                          
3 A detailed description and in depth reflection on KEEP COOL is given by Eisenack (2013). 
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Participants reported a good understanding of the items: only a small portion stated strong or slight 
difficulties with single questions (2.4%) or terms (14%). 
Table 1: Overview on research design  
 pregame in-game postgame 
concept • beliefs about 
international climate 
politics 
• cooperation and 
defection 
• beliefs about 
international climate 
politics  
variables • items: responsibility, 
polconfidence, intercoop, 
pessimism 
• decisions for carbon 
neutral (green) and 
carbon emitting (black) 
technologies 
• items: responsibility, 
polconfidence, 
intercoop, pessimism 
instrument for 
data collection 
• pregame survey with 
standardized closed 
form questionnaire 
• tracking in-game 
decisions with 
standardized 
observation sheet 
• postgame survey with 
standardized closed 
form questionnaire 
 
Table 2: Descriptions of dependent, independent and control variables 
Dependent variables 
responsibility 
polconfidence 
intercoop 
 
pessimism 
Item „I feel personally responsible to stop climate change.“ 
Item: „I think politicians will do everything necessary to stop climate change.“ 
Item: „I believe that there will be an effective international climate protection 
agreement in the future.” 
Item: “Politics will not mitigate climate change, anyway.” 
Independent variables 
black Player’s total number of decisions for carbon emitting technologies 
green 
game 
Player’s total number of decisions for carbon neutral technologies 
Dummy variable for playing KEEP COOL; 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Control variables 
umbrella Dummy for game role ‘USA & Partners’; 1 = yes, 0 = no 
polconfidence-pre 
intercoop-pre 
Item polconfidence in pregame survey. 
Item intercoop in pregame survey. 
gender Gender of player; 1 = female, 2 = male 
age Age of player 
experience 
motivation 
Item: “How often do you play board or parlour games?“ 
Item: “I played Keep Cool engaged and highly motivated.” 
rules Item: “I have well understood the rules of the game.“ 
teamplay Item: “I have worked together with other players in the game.” 
Note: Items have been translated from their original German versions to English. 
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3.4 Statistical analysis 
We take a two-step approach to test the influence of playing a simulation game on the beliefs about 
international climate politics. First, we test whether playing KEEP COOL has any systematic effect on beliefs 
at all. Therefore, we pool pregame and postgame survey results in a panel regression and study the 
coefficient and significance of the dummy variable game on beliefs. We estimate a linear fixed-effects panel 
model to account for time-invariant interpersonal heterogeneity 
 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽 𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑎 = 1, 2 indicates pre- and postgame time, 𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the dummy variable for whether the game has 
been played, 𝛼𝑖 are individual fixed-effects for player 𝑎 = 1, … ,𝑁 and 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Second, we employ an ordinary least square linear regression to relate in-game decisions to postgame 
beliefs about international climate politics 
 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑖 + 𝜷𝒙𝒊 + 𝑎𝑖, (2) 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑖 and 𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑖 are the independent variables, and 𝒙𝒊 is a vector of control variables for 
individual 𝑎 according to Table 2, and 𝑎𝑖 is the error term. For robustness checks, several sets of control 
variables are compared. While ordinary least square regression eases interpretation, we also run an 
ordered-probit regression to confirm or qualify results. 
4. Results 
We first discuss the representativeness of the sample and the quality of the instruments. Subsequently we 
turn to the descriptive statistics on in-game decisions and belief changes, to the effect of gaming on beliefs, 
and finally to how this relates to in-game decisions. 
4.1 Representativeness 
Participants are aged between 13 and 16 years (mean: 14.5, standard deviation: 1.3) with balanced gender 
ratio. We first compare responses in the pregame survey with the 16th Shell Youth Study (Infratest 2010), 
which is a standardized, quantitative and representative survey on beliefs and attitudes of German 
adolescents (n = 2060, age 12 to 25). 
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Figure 1: Comparison of four selected items from the pregame survey with the 16th Shell Youth Study. Where responses were 
given on five and seven point Likert scales, respectively, these are summarized to three categories (agreement, indecisiveness, 
disagreement) for comparability. 
The responses are fairly similar distributed (Figure 1). Where item anchors are identical (item awareness) a 
Chi-square test rejects the zero hypothesis that both distributions are independent. Both studies show 
similar response patterns for the inevitability of climate change, the historic responsibility of industrialized 
countries, the trust in technological solutions and problem awareness. Overall, the similarities in responses 
indicate some representativeness of our study for youths in Germany. 
4.2 Objectivity, reliability and construct validity 
The objectivity of surveys is generally high due to the standardized closed-form questionnaires, which were 
filled out by the players under presence of the first author. As the objectivity of observing in-game 
decisions is more critical, we only record cooperation and defection that is visible through a flow of in-game 
currency. A standardized observation sheet and a detailed facilitation guideline were used to guarantee 
objectivity. 
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To assess the reliability of the instruments, both beliefs and in-game decisions were measured with several 
different variables. In addition to those given in Table 2, further items were constructed: governcoop (“I 
think governments of the world will realize that cooperation is the best way to stop climate change”), 
egoism (“Climate change will not be stopped, because all countries only care for themselves“), needless 
(“We do not need international agreements to protect the climate. It is sufficient if every country conducts 
the climate change mitigation that is good for herself“). All six items were, firstly, checked for systematic 
changes between pregame and postgame survey. Three items (polconficence, intercoop, pessimism) show 
unidirectional changes across all five anchors of the Likert-scale. Secondly, we assessed correlations 
between items, and excluded items with little or implausible item intercorrelations (egoism, needles, 
governcoop). Again the same subset of items (polconfidence, intercoop, pessimism) shows significant 
correlations. Thirdly, the discriminatory power of the items was assessed by correlating each item with a 
sum index of all other items. The items egoism, needles and governcoop show little discriminatory power. 
Based on these considerations the items polconfidence, intercoop and pessimism were selected for further 
analysis, together with the established item responsibility. 
Reliability of the independent variables (black and green) was tested by pairwise considering correlations 
with the following further variables: the global mean temperature (which is tracked in the game), and in-
game emission reductions by closing ‘black factories’. The variable black is significantly positive related with 
temperature, both measuring defection. Emissions reductions are significantly positive correlated with 
green factories, both measuring cooperation. Interestingly, black and green are not significantly correlated. 
This suggests that both variables capture different notions of cooperation, but might also be partly an 
artefact of the differences of player’s roles (wealthy country groups are able to invest more; this is one 
reason why we control for players of the Umbrella Group). 
Finally, we tested the validity of the instruments by correlating the measured variables pairwise with items 
from established studies. Two core items (polconfidence and intercoop) are significantly correlated with 
established items showing intuitive signs. For instance, polconfidence is positively related to a perceived 
futility of individual action and intercoop is negatively correlated to the statement that climate change is 
inevitabile. Interestingly, in-game decisions for carbon neutral technology (green) is significant positively 
correlated with the statement that actors pursue their own political and economic goals. 
4.3 In-game decisions and change in beliefs 
Participants show clear changes in their beliefs about international climate politics after playing KEEP COOL. 
For illustration, in Figure 2 the two lowest and highest categories of the five point Likert scale have been 
summed up to ‘disagreement’ and ‘agreement’. The feeling of personal responsibility (polconfidence) is 
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higher after playing the game, probably due to higher problem awareness for climate change from the 
occupation within the game. Players get a stronger expectation that there will be effective international 
cooperation (intercoop). This is probably because they experienced the necessity of global cooperation for 
climate change mitigation in the game. On the contrary, the expectation that politicians will solve the 
problem (polconfidence) decreases. This might be due to in-game experience of contradictory incentives 
and trade-offs between climate change mitigation and economic growth politicians are facing.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of pregame and postgame survey results for selected items (n = 235) (Disagreement, indecisiveness and 
agreement in percent). 
Two sided t-tests reveal that the change in beliefs before and after playing the game for responsibility, 
intercoop and pessimism4 are significant at the p < 0.05 level5. 
                                                          
4 The p-value for the two-sided t-test for the item polconfidence is 0.21. 
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We see high variability of players’ decisions and of game outcomes between the game sessions, in 
particular with respect to cooperation and defection. While in six sessions players managed to decarbonize 
their economy by the end of the game, in eleven and ten sessions climate change was moderate and 
severe, respectively, and in five sessions even tipped across the edge of dangerous climate change. Also 
variables for in-game cooperation (green) and defection (black) vary much between players and game 
sessions (Figure 3). There are purely cooperative and purely defective sessions, but also a continuum 
between these extremes. 
 
Figure 3: In-game decisions per session (n=38) for carbon neutral (green) and carbon-emitting (black) technologies. 
4.4 Effect of gaming on beliefs 
Next, we are interested whether the observed changes in beliefs relate to gaming. We test the zero 
hypotheses that playing KEEP COOL (the dummy variable game), has no effect on beliefs about 
international climate politics (see Table 3). 
We find that playing KEEP COOL indeed significantly affects the sense of personal responsibility for climate 
change positively (responsibility), confirming Hypotheses H1.1. This is probably caused by higher problem 
awareness, for instance due to experiencing climate change impacts in the game. Also the expectation of 
effective cooperation in international climate politics (intercoop) increases (Hypothesis H1.3). Thus, 
experiencing the complex dynamics of international climate politics does not prevent players from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 This also holds when (i) using a non-parametric test like the Wilcoxon signed rank test, (ii) aggregating the data in 
three answer categories as depicted in Figure 2, (iii) or considering only the subset of responses for which also data on 
in-game decision exist. 
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becoming more optimistic regarding the evolution of an international climate regime. Also the perception 
that politics cannot do anything against climate change (pessimism) is significantly lowered by gaming 
(Hypothesis H1.4). Stepping in the shoes of country group’s leaders, players learn the option space global 
climate politics has. 
Table 3: Panel regression of effect of playing KEEP COOL on beliefs about international climate politics 
 Dependent variable: 
responsibility polconfidence intercoop pessimism 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
game 0.467*** 0.083 0.137** -0.234*** 
(0.059) (0.068) (0.062) (0.077) 
Observations 463 462 460 455 
R2 0.216 0.007 0.021 0.041 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
There is no significant effect for confidence in politicians (polconfidence) (Hypothesis H1.2). This merits 
attention in light of the positive effect on intercoop, which seems closely related. This might indicate that 
changing beliefs relate to more specific characteristics of in-game experience not captured by the dummy 
variable game. To get a more in depth understanding, we next relate beliefs to in-game decisions and 
personal attributes. 
4.5 Effect of in-game decisions on beliefs 
Finally, we are interested in how playing KEEP COOL changes beliefs about international climate politics. 
We test how players’ cooperative or defective in-game decisions relate to postgame beliefs6 (Table 4). 
The analysis reveals that raising the own emissions in the game (black) has a significant negative impact on 
the probability to believe politicians will do everything necessary to stop climate change (polconfidence, 
models 1–3). This supports the hypothesis that less cooperative in-game behavior makes players less 
optimistic about climate politics (Hypothesis 2.1). Players trying out a defective strategy might have 
experienced the structures and incentives hindering global cooperation. Following this interpretation, KEEP 
COOL facilitates experiential learning about the obstacles to international climate treaty making. 
                                                          
6 Ordered-probit and logit regressions, which are more suitable for ordinal data such as responses on a Likert scale, 
yield qualitative identical results (see Appendix). We report here the results for OLS regressions, as readers might be 
more convenient in reading those. 
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In contrast, players’ expectation on an effective international climate agreement (intercoop) is positively 
related to raising their own emissions (models 4–6). One reason might be that defective players have 
experienced the impacts of unmitigated climate change in the game, thereby getting insights into the 
shortcomings of voluntary action. Hence, players defecting in the game might become convinced of the 
necessity of a global environmental agreement in order to prevent dangerous climate change like they 
experienced in game. 
Hypothesis 2.2 is also supported by the significantly negative relation of polconfidence to green (models 2, 
3). Players with more carbon neutral technologies in the game become less optimistic that politicians will 
sufficiently act. Thus, players choosing a more cooperative strategy are not naïve in assuming real world 
politicians will act the same. In fact the opposite might be true: Players testing a more climate friendly 
strategy might have suffered from free-riding and hence become more sensitive to the difficulties of free-
riding. 
Lastly, we turn to the control variables. Players perceiving themselves as cooperative within the game 
(teamplay) have a significant higher optimism in politicians stopping climate change and effective 
international climate politics, which is in line with Hypothesis 2.1. The answers in the pregame survey 
(polconfidence-pre, intercoop-pre) have a strong and significant influence on the postgame survey results. 
Interestingly, through playing the game, expectations of male players that politicians will do anything 
necessary to stop climate change rises more than for female players. Players with a better understanding of 
the game rules (rules), show a significant higher confidence in politicians solving the climate issue. Player 
that felt highly motivated and engaged in KEEP COOL (motivation) become more optimistic about an 
effective climate treaty, but not so in terms of confidence in politicians. This might give some evidence for 
the importance of emotions for learning from simulation games. 
In general, these findings show that players do not translate their more or less climate friendly in-game 
decisions one-to-one to their beliefs about climate politics. KEEP COOL facilitates both choosing climate 
friendly and damaging technologies to win the game and in some regards players choosing less (more) 
climate friendly technologies exhibit more (less) optimistic beliefs about international climate politics. Thus, 
we find playing climate friendly in-game not to be a prerequisite for learning for sustainability. Instead, the 
experience from testing out in-game strategies matters and might result in different beliefs about 
international climate politics. 
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Table 4: Linear regression of in-game decisions, personal attributes and beliefs about international climate politics 
 Dependent variable: 
 polconfidence intercoop 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
black -0.128** 
(0.063) 
-0.154** 
(0.065) 
-0.155** 
(0.064) 
0.126** 
(0.062) 
0.121* 
(0.064) 
0.109* 
(0.064) 
green  -0.069* 
(0.039) 
-0.069* 
(0.038) 
 -0.015 
(0.038) 
-0.018 
(0.038) 
teamplay   0.137** 
(0.059) 
  0.155** 
(0.060) 
polconfidence-
pre 
 
0.407*** 
(0.064) 
0.401*** 
(0.064) 
0.401*** 
(0.063) 
   
intercoop-pre    0.348*** 
(0.081) 
0.347*** 
(0.081) 
0.337*** 
(0.080) 
umbrella 0.211 
(0.165) 
0.407** 
(0.198) 
0.399** 
(0.195) 
-0.132 
(0.163) 
-0.089 
(0.197) 
-0.087 
(0.195) 
gender 0.262** 0.253** 0.282** 0.088 0.086 0.140 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) 
age 0.027 0.020 0.021 0.006 0.005 -0.0004 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) 
experience 0.029 0.025 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.017 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) 
motivation -0.026 -0.008 -0.057 0.165** 0.169** 0.118 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.080) (0.082) 
rules 0.165** 0.177** 0.188** -0.066 -0.063 -0.053 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
constant 0.273 0.369 -0.025 1.278 1.299 0.922 
 (1.059) (1.054) (1.054) (1.035) (1.039) (1.039) 
Observations 184 184 182 182 182 180 
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.212 0.232 0.114 0.109 0.140 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
This study has provided quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of a simulation game to communicate 
and teach scientific insights on international climate politics. Results were based on a sample of over two 
hundred secondary school students in Germany using the simulation game KEEP COOL. A main innovation 
of this paper was to study the potential of a simulation games for experiential learning in the context of 
climate change by linking in-game decisions to changing beliefs about climate politics. 
We found, first, that players indeed change their beliefs about international climate politics. After playing 
the game, respondents report significantly more confidence in the potential for climate politics, more 
optimism about international cooperation on dealing with climate change, and a higher personal 
responsibility. Second, changes in beliefs relate to players in-game decisions in a non-trivial way. Our 
analysis shows that students playing KEEP COOL in a more cooperative way tend to become more 
optimistic about politicians solving the problem, but become more skeptical about an effective 
international climate agreement. 
These findings confirm the potential of simulation games for experiential learning in the context of climate 
change, where players can test different mitigation policies and experience the consequences of the 
associated system dynamics. Simulation games can effectively communicate and teach the mechanisms of 
international climate politics. While it is often held that climate friendly in-game decisions needs to be 
rewarded in order to stimulate learning for sustainability, our results indicate that effective climate games 
do not need to require climate protection as winning condition from the players. On the contrary, it might 
be a good design choice if players experience obstacles to climate protection by reproducing them on their 
own within the game. 
Future research could extend our analysis in multiple ways. Employing a control group with conventional 
learning methods would assess the results. Varying the sample, for instance to policy makers in the context 
of climate change, or to students from other countries, could provide insights on generalization. 
Interactions between players and learning effects could be compared between board game and the digital 
version of KEEP COOL (Eisenack et al. 2016, Erb 2015, Marscheider and Meya 2017). Moreover, 
observations indicate that players are emotionally strongly affected by the game. Investigating the role of 
emotions for learning from simulation games on climate change might be a promising path for future 
research. Relatedly, communication within a game is often intensive and has been found to improve the 
management of complex public goods (Lindahl et al. 2015). 
THESys Discussion Paper No. 2017-3 
 
21 
 
Any such study has its limitations. First, while our aim was to study gaming effectiveness in an aggregated 
and quantitative way, we did not study the process of belief formation. Second, we were interested in the 
changes in believes immediately after playing the game, as this offers entry points for subsequent group 
discussion or debriefing. Yet, the long-term effect remains unstudied. Third, we tested changes of beliefs 
before debriefing took plays to get an isolated measure for the potential of KEEP COOL. However, 
debriefing is critical to learn from game experience (Crookall 2010; Mendler de Suarez et al. 2012). The 
differences in the players’ game experience and their changes in beliefs would offer fruitful entry points. 
Thus, the potential for experiential learning assessed in this study is likely to be a rather conservative 
estimate. Finally, while the sample holds some representativeness for Germany, it is unclear how far our 
results can be generalized. In other countries, pre-existing knowledge and beliefs about climate change and 
games might be substantially different. However, representative surveys reveal that the German 
population is only slightly more concerned about climate change than the European average (European 
Commission 2015: 24, 53)7. 
Overall, our findings emphasize the potential of gaming to communicate and teach climate change. They 
contribute to the validation of the effectiveness of games, and show how well-designed climate games can 
complement conventional methods. Climate games offer an environment where alternative strategies can 
be tested. Moreover, they help to develop individual beliefs about sustainable development by 
experiencing complex system dynamics that are not tangible in everyday life. 
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6. Appendix 
6.1 Ordered-probit regression table 
 
Table 5: Ordered-probit regressions of in-game decisions, personal attributes and beliefs about international climate politics. 
 Dependent variable: 
polconfidence intercoop 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
black -0.169** -0.205** -0.213** 0.168** 0.161* 0.148* 
 (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.081) (0.083) (0.083) 
green  -0.093* -0.095*  -0.020 -0.024 
  (0.050) (0.050)  (0.049) (0.049) 
teamplay   0.182**   0.204*** 
   (0.077)   (0.079) 
polconfidence-
pre 
0.529*** 0.526*** 0.536***    
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.087)    
intercoop-pre    0.458*** 0.457*** 0.451*** 
    (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) 
umbrella 0.299 0.567** 0.568** -0.175 -0.118 -0.117 
 (0.209) (0.254) (0.255) (0.210) (0.253) (0.254) 
gender 0.310** 0.299** 0.345** 0.122 0.119 0.193 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.153) (0.148) (0.148) (0.152) 
age 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.007 -0.0003 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) 
experience 0.035 0.030 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.021 
 (0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) 
motivation -0.030 -0.006 -0.069 0.223** 0.228** 0.165 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.106) (0.103) (0.103) (0.107) 
rules 0.218** 0.239** 0.257*** -0.091 -0.087 -0.0075 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) 
Observations 184 184 182 182 182 180 
Log Likelihood -222.033 -220.279 -214.602 -219.636 -219.553 -214.332 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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6.2 Supplementary material 
6.2.1 Pregame questionnaire (German original)  
 
Angaben zur Person 
Wie alt bist Du?    ____ Jahre      Geschlecht :   1 weiblich    2 männlich 
 
0_1 Wie häufig spielst Du Brett- beziehungsweise Gesellschaftsspiele? 
1 nie 2 mehrmals im Jahr 3 etwa jeden Monat 4  etwa jede Woche 5 täglich 
0_2 Wie häufig spielst Du Computerspiele? 
1 nie 2 mehrmals im Jahr 3 etwa jeden Monat 4  etwa jede Woche            5 täglich  
Wahrnehmung des Klimawandels 
Im Folgenden spielen wir ein Spiel zur internationalen Klimapolitik. Wir würden Dir vorher gerne ein paar 
Fragen zu Deinen Einschätzungen zum Klimawandel und zur Klimapolitik stellen. 
1_3 Hast Du vom Klimawandel bereits etwas gehört?  
1  ja 
2  ja, aber weiß nicht was das ist 
3  nein 
1_4 Hältst Du den Klimawandel für… 
1 kein Problem 
2  ein kleines Problem 
3  ein großes Problem 
4  für ein sehr großes Problem 
Einschätzungen und Einstellungen zum Klimaschutz 
Im Folgenden würden wir Dich gerne nach Deiner Meinung zum Klimaschutz fragen. Bitte sag uns, ob die 
folgenden Aussagen überhaupt nicht, eher nicht, teils teils, eher oder voll und ganz zu treffen. 
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils 
teils 
eher voll und 
ganz 
2_5vIch fühle mich persönlich verantwortlich, 
den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. 1 2 3 4 5 
2_6 Ich fühle mich durch den Klimawandel 
bedroht. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_7v Ich denke, dass die Politiker und 
Politikerinnen, alles notwendige tun werden, 
um den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_8 Ich als Einzelner kann keinen großen 
Beitrag gegen den Klimawandel leisten. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_9v Es ist zwecklos, meinen Beitrag für die 
Umwelt zu leisten, solange andere sich nicht ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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genauso verhalten. 
2_10v Es ist bereits zu spät, gegen den 
Klimawandel kann man nichts mehr tun. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_11 Wissenschaft und Technik werden die 
Umwelt- und Klimaprobleme lösen, ohne dass 
wir unsere Lebensweise ändern müssen. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_12 Ich tue das, was für das Klima richtig ist, 
auch wenn mich das mehr Geld oder Zeit 
kostet. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Einstellungen zur internationalen Klimapolitik 
Bitte kreuze an, inwieweit Du den Aussagen zur internationalen Klimapolitik zustimmst. 
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils 
teils 
eher voll und 
ganz 
3_13v Ärmere Staaten sollten beim 
Klimaschutz von reicheren Staaten unterstützt 
werden. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3_14v Für den Klimawandel sind vor allem die 
reichen Industrieländer verantwortlich. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3_15v Es müsste verbindliche internationale 
Abkommen für den Umweltschutz geben, an 
die sich Deutschland und andere Länder 
halten müssten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Einschätzungen zur internationalen Klimapolitik 
Bitte kreuze an, inwieweit Du den folgenden Einschätzung zur internationalen Klimapolitik zustimmt. 
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils 
teils 
eher voll und 
ganz 
4_16v Ich denke, die Staaten der Welt werden 
einsehen, dass Zusammenarbeit die beste 
Lösung ist, um den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_17v Der Klimawandel wird nicht 
aufgehalten, weil alle Länder nur an sich 
denken. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_18v Ich glaube, dass es in der Zukunft ein 
wirkungsvolles internationales Abkommen 
zum Klimaschutz geben wird. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_19v Wir brauchen keine internationalen 
Absprachen um das Klima zu schützen. Es 
reicht, wenn jedes Land so viel Klimaschutz 
macht, wie gut für es selbst ist.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_20v Die Politik bringt sowie nichts, um den 
Klimawandel aufzuhalten. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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6.2.2 Postgame questionnaire (German original) 
Nachdem Du Keep Cool gespielt hast, würden wir Dich gerne noch einmal nach Deiner Meinung zum 
Klimaschutz befragen. Inwieweit stimmst Du den Folgenden Aussagen zu? 
  
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils teils eher voll und 
ganz 
2_5n Ich fühle mich persönlich verantwortlich, 
den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. 1 2 3 4 5 
2_7n Ich denke, dass die Politiker und 
Politikerinnen, alles notwendige tuen werden, 
um den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_9n Es ist zwecklos, meinen Beitrag für die 
Umwelt zu leisten, solange andere sich nicht 
genauso verhalten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
2_10n Es ist bereits zu spät, gegen den 
Klimawandel kann man nichts mehr tun. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Einstellungen zur internationalen Klimapolitik 
Bitte kreuze an, inwieweit Du den Aussagen zur internationalen Klimapolitik zustimmst. 
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils teils eher voll und 
ganz 
3_13n Ärmere Staaten sollten beim 
Klimaschutz von reicheren Staaten unterstützt 
werden. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3_14n Für den Klimawandel sind vor allem die 
reichen Industrieländer verantwortlich. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
3_15n Es müsste verbindliche internationale 
Abkommen für den Umweltschutz geben, an 
die sich Deutschland und andere Länder 
halten müssten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Einschätzungen zur internationalen Klimapolitik 
Bitte kreuze an, inwieweit Du den folgenden Einschätzung zur internationalen Klimapolitik zustimmt. 
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils teils eher voll und 
ganz 
4_16n Ich denke, die Staaten der Welt werden 
einsehen, dass Zusammenarbeit die beste 
Lösung ist, um den Klimawandel aufzuhalten. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_17n Der Klimawandel wird nicht 
aufgehalten, weil alle Länder nur an sich 
denken. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_18n Ich glaube, dass es in der Zukunft ein 
wirkungsvolles internationales Abkommen ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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zum Klimaschutz geben wird. 
4_19n Wir brauchen keine internationalen 
Absprachen um das Klima zu schützen. Es 
reicht, wenn jedes Land so viel Klimaschutz 
macht, wie gut für es selbst ist.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
4_20n Die Politik bringt sowie nichts, um den 
Klimawandel aufzuhalten. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
Spielerfahrung 
Bitte sag uns, wie Du Dein eigenes Verhalten beim Spielen erlebt hast.  
 über-
haupt 
nicht 
eher 
nicht 
teils teils eher voll und 
ganz 
5_21 Ich war engagiert und motiviert beim 
Spiel dabei. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5_22 Ich hatte das Gefühl die Spielregeln des 
Spiels gut zu verstehen. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5_23 Ich habe im Spiel mit anderen 
zusammengearbeitet. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
5_24 Ich habe vor allem versucht das 5 
wirtschaftliche und politische Ziel meiner 
Region zu erreichen. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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